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How The 1992 Legislation
Will Affect European Financial
Services
I. HE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC Community
(EC) was created by the Treaty of Rome of
1957. Its intention was to create an integrated
“Common Market” within which goods, services,
labor and capital would move freely. In its early
years, the implementation of the Treaty of Rome
focused on eliminating tariff barriers on trade
in goods between the member countries. Barriers
affecting capital movements and trade in serv-
ices were neglected, while those affecting labor
mobility, such as lack of recognition of profes-
sional qualifications across member countries,
were greatly reduced but not eliminated.
A major initiative to eliminate all remaining
barriers to intra-EC trade began in 1985. This is
referred to as the “single market program” or
“1992,” its target date for completion (in reality,
the end of 1992).’ The legislation underlying the
single market program affects virtually every
product area. This paper examines one key por-
tion of the legislation: the regulatory changes
that pertain directly to banking and other finan-
cial services.’
In 1985, this sector accounted for 6.4 percent
of total output and 2.9 percent of employment.’
Since the sector provides services for other sec-
tors, the integration of EC financial markets will
affect efficiency not only within the financial




The commitment to eliminate the remaining
EC trade barriers was formalized in the Single
European Act (SEA), which was signed in 1985
and came into force on July 1, 1987. (See the
shaded insert on pages 64-65 for additional high-
lights on EC history and a description of institu-
tions and legislative instruments.) The SEA
defines both the goal—”an area without internal
‘For a recent overview of 1992, see Boucher (1991).
‘Grilli (1989b) summarizes the numerous restrictions affect-
ing international trade and investment transactions in the
‘See Emerson et al. (1988) for additional details on the
economic dimensions of the financial services sector.
financial services sector, both in the BC and in other deve-
loped countries.63
frontiers in which the free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital is ensured’‘—and
the target date—the end of 1992. It also incorpo-
rates reforms to speed up decision-making within
the EC by establishing “qualified majority voting”
to decide most issues of the reform process.’
In 1985, the EC Commission produced a White
Paper entitled “Completing the Internal Market.”
It hsted numerous measures thought to be neces-
sary for the completion of the program, many
of which have not yet been adopted.’ Because
of the large number of required measures, all
harriers cannot be eliminated at once.’
The large number of proposals and the time
necessary to consider a given proposal contrib-
ute to 1992 being a process rather than an
event. Each directive must go through a com-
plex process of discussion, first within the Com-
mission and then in the Council of Ministers.
Member state governments must be informed at
each stage because they wish to consult with
the domestic parties that will be affected. Parlia-
ments of member states, as well as the Europe-
an Parliament, also comment on each proposal.
Finally, each agreement has to be ratified and
reflected in the legislation of each member state.
A typical EC directive could take three years
from first draft to Council ratification, with
another two years or so for full implementation.
Only measures close to adoption in early 1992
(or already adopted) will be implemented by the
end of 1992; and measures not yet drafted will
not be implemented before the mid-1990s.
‘Key (1989) notes that under qualified majority voting, the
number of votes of each member is weighted roughly ac-
cording to its population. To adopt legislation, 54 votes out
of a total of 76 are required.
‘According to Hill (1991), as of December 1991,65 of the
282 measures outlined in the White Paper remained to be
adopted. A goal of the BC Commission was to have all
measures adopted by year-end 1991 to allow member na-
tions to convert the directives into national legislation.
Problems with the directives are also occurring at the na-
tional level. For example, Italy has converted only half of
the relevant directives into national law.
‘Capie and Wood (1990) stress that gradual deregulation of
the financial system is unlikely to cause instability. The
history of deregulation, they note, reveals that only rapid
changes in regulation threaten the stability of the financial
system.
‘According to Bannock et al. (1972), exchange controls are
government policies that attempt to control the purchases
and sales offoreign currencies undertaken by the resi-
dents of a specific country. For example, the Exchange
Control Act of 1947 restricted the purposes for which for-
eign currencies could be bought by British residents and
limited the use and retention of foreign currencies and
gold they acquired.
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Before the 1980s, no systematic attempts had
been made to reduce trade barriers in financial
services. Although services had been addressed
when the EC was formed in 1957, the implemen-
tation of intra-EC free trade in services had
been neglected. Moreover, trade in financial
services had not been covered by multilateral
negotiations under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GAIT). (This may change in
the current Uruguay Round of negotiations.)
More important, many countries maintained
exchange controls for capital account transac-
tions long beyond when they liberalized current
account transactions.’ Without a free flow of
financial capital to balance the flows of goods
between countries, “free” trade is constrained
by capital controls. That is, financial services,
which include a range of banking, investment
and insurance services, cannot be freely provid-
ed across borders if access to foreign exchange
is restricted.
Thus, an important step before removing
specific restrictions on cross-border trade in
financial services is to remove all exchange con-
trols. Such a step was provided for by the Coun-
cil Directive of June 24, 1988—The Capital
Liberalization Directive—which removes con-
trols on all capital flows within the EC and, forAn Overview of the European community
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‘For more details on the EC. see Rosenberg f1991)Major Post-War Steps Towards European Integration
1947 Customs Union formed between Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg “Benelux”
1948 Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) formed to administer U.S
aid for rebuilding post-war Europe.
1951 France, West Germany Italy and Benelux form European Coal and Sleet Community
(ECSC) providing for a “Common Market” in these products
1957 Treaties of Rome establish the six-member (Belgium, France Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands and West Germany) European Economic Community (EC) and the Europe-
an Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)
1960 European Free Trade Association (EFTA) formed to promote free trade between non
EC Western European countries Austria Britain, Denmark, Finland Iceland, Norway,
Portugal Sweden and Switzerland
1962 Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) started
1963 Britain s application to join EC vetoed by President de Gaulle
1965 France boycotts EC in protest at excessive speed of integration moves
1968 Customs union completed
1970 “Werner Report’ calls for Economic and Monetary Union within Europe - including a
single currency
1972 European exchange rate “Snake’ arrangement formed, but the United Kingdom
leaves the Snake after six weeks
1973 United Kingdom Denmark and Ireland join the EC
1979 European Monetary System (EMS) formed -establishing the Exchange Rate Mechan-
ism (ERM) and the European Currency Unit (ECU). Britain joins EMS but not ERM.
1979 First direct elections to European Parliament.
1981 Greece joins EC.
1983 Common Fisheries Policy established,
1985 White Paper on completing the internal market published.
1986 Spain and Portugal join EC.
1987 Single European Act comes into force.
1989 Delors Report calls for Economic and Monetary Union - including a single currency.
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities took effect.
1990 United Kingdom joins ERM and Capital Liberalization Directive and Second Non-life In-
surance Directive took effect.
1991 Maastricht Summit Accords on monetary and political union. The third and final stage
of Economic and Monetary Union will begin by January 1, 1999. A single European
currency will begin by this date (possibly as early as January 1, 1997). An independent
European Central Bank will be set up six months before the single currency.
1993 Second Coordinating Bank Directive, Own Funds Directive, Solvency Ratio Directive
and Second Life Insurance Directive take effect. Council Directive on Investment Serv-
ices in the Securities Field and the Capital Adequacy Directive likely take effect.
The enforcement of EC laws is the respon- ments of member states. Where this proce-
sibility of the Commission. Where breaches of dure proves insufficient, the Commission may
EC laws are suspected, the Commission may refer the issue to the European Court of
issue a formal letter of notice to the govern- Justice.the most part, on capital flows between an EC
member and a non-member. For most member
states, this directive was to apply from July t
199O.~The deadline has been met, though several
countries) like the United Kingdom, Germany,
the Netherlands and Denmark) had eliminated
explicit controls before 1988.°
Various approaches have been used to quanti-
fy the integration of international financial mar-
kets. One way to see the effects of the relaxation
of capital controls is to examine interest rates
on comparable financial instruments in different
countries that are denominated in the same cur-
rency. The elimination of capital controls should
allow capital flows to equalize these interest
rates.1°‘This is exactly what has happened in
the EC countries that have already eliminated
capital controls. Figure 1 presents evidence for
the United Kingdom, which abolished exchange
controls as of October 24, 1979, and undertook
a series of domestic liberalization measures in
the 1980s. The U.K’s deregulation has caused
the Eurosterling-London Interhank Offer Rate
(LIBOR) spread to collapse near zero.11 Similar
evidence exists for other EC countries that have
liberalized. 12
This evidence suggests that most of the effects
of liberalizing capital flows for some) but not
all) countries have already been realized) rein-
forcing the point that 1992 is a series of changes.
There are, however, additional gains possible
from the 1992 process. One is that 1992 will
make it less costly for financial firms from one
member country to he authorized to provide
services in other EC countries. New financial
services, as well as lower prices for existing
services) might also occur. Before discussing
these potential gains, we will summarize the
major directives that pertain directly to financial
services.
The major directives of the 1992 program for
financial services can be divided into four cate-
gories: banking, investment services, undertak-
ings for collective investments and insurance.”
Efforts at EC coordination did not be-
gin with the Single European Act for any of the
four categories of financial services. Rather, the
SEA has accelerated the process of harmonizing
regulations. For example, the First Banking
Coordination Directive, which was approved by
the Council in December 1977, required mem-
ber states to establish systems for authorizing
and supervising credit institutions.”
A second example is the Consolidation Super-
vision Directive of June 1983, which required
that credit institutions he supervised on a con-
solidated basis. Any credit institution owning 25
percent or more of the capital of another’ finan-
cial institution was to be supervised on a con-
solidated basis by the authorities in the owning
institution’s home state. Another provision man-
dated the exchange of information between su-
pervising authorities to obtain an overview of a
consolidated company’s affairs. To assist this su-
pervisory cooperation, the Bank Accounts Direc-
tive of December 1986 harmonized accounting
rules for credit institutions.
In the 1992 legislation, the Second Coordinat-
ing Banking Directive (2BD) is the primary bank-
ing directive. The ZEn allows any credit institu-
tion authorized in one member country to es-
tablish branches and provide banking services
anywhere in the EC. While this so-called “coin-
mon passport” allows home-country authoriza-
tion, the credit institution must conform to all
local laws. Thus, the host country’s business
rules, such as reporting requirements and res-
8lreland, Spain, Greece and Portugal have until the end of
1992 to comply, with the latter two having the option to de-
lay compliance until 1995,
°Accordingto Blundell-Wignall and Browne (1991), the in-
tegration of financial markets internationally began in the
mid-1970s with the removal of capital controls in Germany,
the United States and Canada. Japan and the United
Kingdom relaxed capital controls in the late 1970s, while
France, Italy and some other EC countries realized the
complete elimination of controls by the middle of 1990.
“This result is analogous to the effect of eliminating trade
barriers on goods. When a country eliminates a tariff on a
specific good, the difference between the price of the good
in the country’s domestic market and that in the interna-
tional market should narrow,
11The two interest rates are ones charged by banks to other
banks for three-month loans denominated in British
pounds. The Eurosterling rate pertains to loans made out-
side the United Kingdom and the LI8OR applies to loans
made inside the United Kingdom.
“See Blundell-Wignall and Browne (1991) for charts similar
to figure 1 for Germany, the Netherlands and France.
“See U.K. Department of Trade and Industry (1991) for a
summary of EC Directives relating to 1992.
14We refer to credit institutions rather than “banks” because
these regulations include institutions other than banks.
These would include the European equivalent of thrifts.Figure 1
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trictions on permissible products and activities,
must be followed.
The 2BD also gives the commission some in-
fluence in authorizing institutions from outside
the EC—the so-called “Reciprocity Clause.” The
first, but not the final, draft of this clause created
much controversy and is partly responsible for
the label “fortress Europe” that has inappropri-
ately been associated with the 1992 program.
(See the shaded insert on page 68 for additional
discussion of this topic.)
The 2BD is supported by the Own Funds
Directive and the Solvency Ratio Directive. The
former provides common definitions for the
components of the capital base; the latter uses
these definitions to establish minimum asset ra-
tios to be met by all credit institutions. All three
directives become effective on January 1, 1993.
A related, but more
problematic) set of measures deals with invest-
ment services. ‘Ibis category covers all aspects
of the markets in tradeable securities, including
investment banking, stock brokerage and the or-
ganization of the exchanges themselves. The key
elements of the 1992 program are formulated in
the Council Directive on Investment Services in
the Securities Field and the Capital Adequacy
Directive, neither of which has been adopted
formally.
Until recently, observers generally thought
both directives would begin operation at the
same time as the banking directives because the
2BD gives banks (and other credit institutions)
the right to do securities business throughout
the EC on a single passport basis. As time pass-
es, this simultaneity becomes less likely. If an






K, ‘/ ~,j/, / //[ K/K / /)/The Second Banking Directive and
Fortress Europe
One of the great concerns, often heard out-
side the EC, is that the 1992 program will
lower barriers to internal trade but at a cost
of higher external trade barriers. The 1992
program does not introduce new barriers to
trade in goods between Europe and the rest
of the world. Nonetheless, a mistaken belief
persists that access to the EC market will be
harder after 1992.
‘I’his belief stems partly from the
“Reciprocity Clause” in early drafts of the Se-
cond Banking Directive. This required the
Commission to evaluate all applications for
new subsidiaries where the parent company
was based outside the EC. The Commission
would have had the power to delay approval
if the other country did not offer “mirror im-
age” reciprocity. Mirror image reciprocity
would have required that EC firms be al-
lowed to operate in foreign countries, just as
they could at home, before access would be
offered to nationals of that country. This
would have been very restrictive. For exam-
ple, because there is no legal separation be-
tween investment banking and commercial
banking in the EC, it would have required
abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act in the United
States before U.S. banks could gain access to
the EC.
This requirement was weakened in later
drafts of the directive. The final directive
simply calls for negotiations with third coun-
tries (that is, countries outside the EC) in the
event that EC firms are denied “effective
market access.” The critical criterion now is
that EC firms should not be discriminated
against in third markets—they should be ac-
corded “national” treatment. “Whenever it ap-
pears to the Commission -- -that EC credit
institutions in a third country do not receive
national treatment offering the same competi-
tive opportunities as are available to domestic
credit institutions and the conditions of effec-
tive market access are not fulfilled, the Com-
mission may initiate negotiations in order to
remedy the situation.”l
If negotiations about unfair treatment in a
non-EC country have been initiated, approval
of ECmarket access by credit institutions from
that country may be delayed by up to three
months. After this time, the Council must de-
cide whether such delays should continue.
This procedure will not apply to any firm al-
ready authorized to trade in an EC country.
Finally, this intervention in the approval
process must not contravene “the Community’s
obligations under any international agree-
ments, bilateral or multilateral, governing the
taking-up and pursuit of the business of
credit institutions.’2 ‘l’he general structure of
the reciprocity clause in the Second Banking
Directive is expected to he copied for the
other major areas of financial services, in-
cluding investment services amid insurance.
15ee Title III, Article 9, paragraph 4 of the 2BD. In offi-
cial documents, the 2BD is the “Second Council Direc-
tive of 15 December 1989.”
2 See Title Ill, Article 9, paragraph 6 of the 2BD.bank securities firms at the same time, they will
be at a disadvantage.
A key problem in formulating regulations in
investment services has been that the range of
activities covered is much more heterogeneous
than in the banking area.’5 Arguments have
arisen about which activities to include and how
much capital should be required for different
lines of business. Initial proposals, for example,
incorporated such high capital requirements
that some businesses objected strongly. Non-
bank securities houses argued that the require-
ments were so onerous, their business would be
driven outside their countries. Universal banks,
on the other hand, feared they would be at a
disadvantage if securities houses had lower re-
quirements than banks.” The latest drafts of
the directives incorporate a compromise that ap-
pears acceptable to both camps. Banks will be
permitted to treat their securities business
separately and calculate capital requirements
under the investment services rules rather than
the banking rules.
Another point of controversy concerns the
provision of compensation schemes for inves-
tors. A commission recommendation in 1986
suggested the establishment of compensation
schemes for depositors (that is, deposit insur-
ance) in credit institutions. In the wider area of
investment services, the position of compensa-
tion schemes is even less clear. Some countries,
like the United Kingdom since the implementa-
tion of the 1986 Financial Services Act, have
compulsory compensation schemes for invest-
ment business, while many others do not. This
position raises potential anomalies in cross-
border business.
A final sticking point in the Investment Serv-
ices Directive relates to the monopoly of or-
ganized stock exchanges over securities trading.
Some countries, like France, have argued for
the official stock exchange to have a monopoly.
Without a monopoly, the present French system
could not be used throughout the EC. Others,
especially the British, are strongly opposed.
K. In
contrast to the banking and investment services
directives, the directive governing Undertakings
for Collective Investment in Transferable Securi-
ties (UCITS), which are open-ended mutual funds,
has already come into effect. ‘The Council Direc-
tive on the coordination of laws relating to UCITS
took effect in October 1989. The directive estab-
lishes minimum requirements for authorization
of UCITS and permits their marketing through-
out the EC. This freedom is subject to the usual
proviso that the host state be notified and local
marketing rules be obeyed. Minimum require-
ments are established for adequate risk spread-
ing, the separation of trustees from managers
and the specification of acceptable investments.
Before it was implemented, there was some
concern that the UCITS Directive would lead to
a migration of UCITS managers to countries,
like Luxembourg and Ireland, with the most
favorable tax treatment. It is too early to deter-
mine whether this expectation is correct. To
counteract this possibility, however, efforts
were made to reduce tax differences. For exam-
ple, the British budget of 1989 reduced taxes on
unit trusts.
h~/runmev.A final set of directives on financial
services deals with insurance. Insurance pro-
vides examples of 1992 initiatives already in ef-
fect as well as those many years away. The
primary directives are the Second Non-Life In-
surance Directive and the Second Life Insurance
Directive.
The Second Non-Life Insurance Directive es-
tablishes freedom of services for cross-border
business within the EC. This fm’eedom, however,
applies only for large commercial risks. What is
15Another reason forthe relatively faster agreement on
banking is that bank regulation had already been well
worked out globally—through the Bank for International
Settlements and formalized in the Basle Agreement. The
1988 Basle Agreement replaced differing national regula-
tions for measuring capital adequacy by a single, interna-
tionally accepted standard. The goals were to strengthen
the soundness of the international banking system and re-
move regulatory differences that affected the international
competitiveness of banks. See Blanden (1988).
‘6Generally speaking, EC countries did not have counter-
parts to U.S. banking regulations that limited their spread
geographically or their lines of business activity. As a
result, a small number of large banks evolved. For exam-
pIe, German banking is dominated by a small number of
banks engaging in normal commercial banking as well as
buying and selling stocks for others, underwriting new
stock issues and owning stock on their own behalf. In fact,
German banks are represented on the boards of directors
of many companies. In the United Kingdom, merchant
banks specialized in the securities business, while com-
mercial banks had the bulk of deposits. Since the deregu-
lation of British financial markets that began on October
27, 1986, known as the Big Bang, U.K. commercial banks
have gone universal in that they have merchant bank sub-
sidiaries and are expanding into insurance services, espe-
cially life insurance. Belgium is the only EC country that
separates investment and commercial banking.referred to as “mass risk,” which includes most
things insured by people other than their lives—
theft and fire damage to personal property—
remains subject to numerous restrictions. A
new, more liberal regime applies to all marine,
aviation and shipment risks, and other fire,
property and financial risks for situations in
which the policy holder is a large commercial
company. Here, the insurer has an obligation to
notify the authorities (in the insured company’s
country), but may write the business directly.
For all other businesses, the authorities in each
country may continue to control the terms of
authorization, premiums, policy conditions and
reserve assets.
This Directive took effect in July 1990 and,
hence, the large commercial risk market has ef-
fectively achieved the single market position al-
ready. Unlike banking, this directive did not
create a common passport. Thus, branching in
other countries is not freely permitted, and es-
tablishment still requires authorization in each
member state. Two draft “Framework Direc-
tives” for life and non-life insurance appeared in
1991 and 1990, respectively. These would estab-
lish the single passport for insurance; the fact
that the first drafts of these directives did not
emerge earlier, however, suggests that they will
not be in operation until 1995 at the earliest.
Only modest progress has been made on life
insurance so far. The Second Life Insurance
Directive was adopted in November 1990 for
implementation on May 21, 1993. It only goes a
small way, however, toward creating a single
market in life insurance. A liberal regime is
provided for, but only in cases where the con-
sumer takes the initiative in buying a life insur-
ance policy from a firm in another member
country. In all other cases, the restrictive re-
gime applies, under which the insurer may he
required to obtain special approval (depending
upon local law) and the policy terms may be
proscribed.
Under the most recent draft of legislation in-
volving life insurance, whose date of implemen-
tation has yet to be agreed upon, insurance com-
panies are permitted to advertise, but they may
not approach consumers directly. It also is pos-
sible that “local” asset backing for the policy
may be required. This means that, for example,
an Italian firm selling insurance in Germany
would have to back its German policies with
German securities. This draft of the legislation
also restricts the role of brokers. For three
years after implementation, member states will
be able to forbid consumers from seeking poli-
cies from other member states through brokers.
Considerable resistance exists in some quart-
ers to the creation of a genuine single market
in life insurance. The basic conflict arises be-
cause some countries—notably Germany—have
had a very conservative attitude to life insur-
ance, while others—like the United Kingdom—
have been very innovative. German insurance
companies have typically invested in safe fixed-
interest securities, and innovation in the indus-
try has been strictly controlled. The United
Kingdom, in contrast, allows its firms to invest
across a range of assets including property and
equities. Thus, the typical British firm’s portfolio
is riskier than its German counterpart, but has
a much higher average yield, producing signifi-
cantly lower prices for British products.
Before discussing the reform process, an im-
portant distinction must be made between
wholesale and retail financial markets. As
demonstrated above, the globalization of inter-
national financial markets in the 1970s and 1980s
has already led to highly competitive wholesale
capital markets across many EC countries.
These markets, in which financial firms deal
directly with each other, experienced considera-
ble competitive pressures in the past 20 years.
Faced with the choice of deregulation or the
loss of firms to less-regulated environments in
other countries, most nations dismantled much
of the regulatory structure in wholesale finan-
cial markets.
Retail markets, in which consumers deal with
firms to borrow money, purchase insurance
and trade stock, are quite different and present
the biggest problem for deregulation. These
markets retain a myriad of complex regulatory
structures and external barriers that are gener-
ally justified on the grounds that they protect
the small consumer.17 Regardless of whether
17For example, the U.K. Financial Services Act of 198B re-
quires any firm selling investment products in the United
Kingdom to register with either the Securities and Invest-
ment Board or a recognized regulatory organization. The
firm must conform to a complex set of rules, subiect itself
to inspections and pay membership charges, which in-
clude investor compensation schemes.domestic officials actually believe this or are
simply disguising their protection of domestic
firms, the abolition of regulations to increase
cross-border trade and competition in retail
financial markets is the primary challenge of
the 1992 program.
Starting with the existing regulatory struc-
tures in each member country, the central prin-
ciple guiding deregulation is that regulators in
each member state are competent to judge which
firms are “fit and proper” to do business in the
industry. Once a firm has been authorized by
the regulatory authority in its home country—
so-called home authorization—it is automatically
authorized to do business in any other member
country and is said to have a “common passport.”
Previously, many countries have allowed firms
from other EC countries freedom of establish-
ment, but this freedom has been subject to a
separate process of approval in each country.58
The abolition of this requirement, therefore,
will make it easier for firms to establish subsidi-
aries in other member countries.
Home authorization, however, is not the end
of the story. Firms operating outside their home
states still have to obey “host country conduct
of business rules.”” In other words, foreign
firms must obey all the local regulations about
the nature of acceptable products and the way
in which they may be advertised and sold. For
example, France does not allow interest pay-
ments on checking deposits, while most other
EC countries do.
The fact that business rules will continue to
differ across countries limits the extent to
which there will be a genuine single market.
The various rules increase the costs of cross-
border activity and are sometimes even anti-
competitive. For example, the business rules in
some member states define which products can
be sold and their respective prices. Thus, one of
the main incentives for attempting to enter new
markets—the introduction of new products not
offered by local firms—is not guaranteed.
The move to a common passport will compli-
cate the regulatory process.2°At this point, only
hypothetical situations can be offered to suggest
the potential difficulties. While firms require
authorization only in their home states, the regu-
latory authorities of other nations have to moni-
tor the activity of these firms within their do-
main because they are responsible for consumer
protection and adherence to business rules.
To illustrate, suppose a German bank estab-
lishes a subsidiary in the United Kingdom after
1992 on the basis of its German banking license.
It takes deposits and makes loans in British
pounds sterling. As the German banking authori-
ties are responsible for prudential supervision,
the bank must file the reports required by
these authorities. The bank, however, must also
register with the Bank of England, fulfill all
reporting requirements and conform to all Brit-
ish banking regulations in the United Kingdom—
including reserve requirements and banking
codes of practice. It must also pay regulatory
fees just as any British bank must do.
The lower costs of establishing an office in
the United Kingdom may increase the regulato-
ry burden of both the British and German
authorities. Suppose, for example, the German
bank gets into difficulties, like a run on deposits,
or is involved in a breach of rules, like fraud.
Clearly, both British and German authorities will
have to get involved to resolve the problem. In-
deed, a bank with branches (or subsidiaries)
across Europe could draw 12 sets of regulators
into a dispute over its operations. The number
of regulators would rise even further if the
“For example, Emerson et al. (1988) note that each EC
country allows freedom of establishment for foreign banks;
however, the conditions under which this may be done
vary substantially across countries. High establishment
costs make it difficult for a foreign bank to enter and com-
pete successfully with an existing domestic retail bank. Ad-
ditional obstacles in certain countries, like Italy and Spain,
are restrictions on foreign acquisitions and involvement
with domestic banks.
“For an alternative interpretation of the implications of
home authorization in the context of the 2BD, see Key
(1989). In our view, home authorization aplies to the issue
of a license and prudential control, but it does not apply to
any behavior that falls under conduct of business rules.
Home authorization is much different than home control.
Even though a bank is given a license to operate abroad
by its home authorities, the bank’s subsidiaries will have
to obey all the laws attached to banking practice in the
foreign countries in which they operate.
20Capie and Wood (1990) make a similar point that the Se-
cond Banking Directive will make supervision and regula-
tion much more complicated. They speculate, however,
that this complexity may cause a change in regulation
from detailed supervision to one in which central banks
are primarily lenders of last resort.Table 1
Deposit Insurance in the Ed
SOURCE; Bartholomew and Vanderhoff (1991).
‘Greece and Portugal have no formal systems of deposit insurance.
2The “—“ indicates no information was available.
bank’s activities spread beyond banking into
securities or insurance.
It is also noteworthy that the British authori-
ties have no power to withdraw the banking
license if the bank transgresses business rules
in the United Kingdom. Even though the Bank
of England could stop a bank from trading tem-
porarily, a high degree of communication and
cooperation between regulators of the member
countries will be required to manage such a
problem. Eventually, there might be a formal
regulatory agency that operates on a
community-wide basis.
The preceding example, which pertains to all
member countries, is relatively simple in com-
parison to the regulatory issues that might arise
when services are provided across national
borders. Suppose the German bank takes de-
posits and makes loans in sterling with retail
customers in the United Kingdom only by mail
or telephone from its head office in Frankfurt.
In this case, the German bank need not register
with the Bank of England, but has an obligation
to conform to British conduct of business rules.
This means that the Bank of England must mo-
nitor this business in some way. While cases
like this may be of trivial quantitative significance
(especially in retail trade), they also may gener-
ate the greatest regulatory headaches, in tem’ms
of allocating regulatory responsibilities for the
monitoring and enforcement of standards of
business practice.
Such jurisdictional problems may be greatest
where deposit insurance is involved. Table 1
summarizes the deposit protection schemes for
commnercial banks in the EC. The amount of
protection for depositors varies substantially
across countries. This may influence where a
specific deposit may be made. The high level of
protection in Italy could attract large depositors.
By the same token, the different levels of pro-
tection may confuse depositors. A Spanish depo-
sitor, who made a deposit in a French branch in
Spain that fails, for example, may mistakenly be-
lieve that the French deposit insurance scheme
applies. Since deposit insurance is politically sen-
sitive, controversy is not difficult to envision.
The EC Commission has drafted a proposal, not
yet published, for the harmonization of deposit
insurance, but any changes are unlikely to take
effect before the mid-1990s.
The almost complete harmonization of regula-
tory standards is inevitable when transactions
within an industry are predominantly of an in-
ternational nature, By itself, however, 1992 is
unlikely to make the transactions in European
retail financial markets to be primarily interna-
tional. Thus, the regulation of retail financial
Coverage2
Limitations Deposits Deposits in Deposits
(in U.S. dollars In foreign domestic branches in foreign
as of July 6, 1990) currency of foreign banks branches Ceuntry
Belgium $14,706 No No No
Denmark 39,708 — ——
France 72,033 No Yes No
Germany 30% of bank’s
liable capital
Yes Yes Yes
Ireland 16,206 — — —
Italy 659,385 Yes Yes Yes
Luxembourg 14,706 — — —
Netherlands 21,486 Yes Yes No
Spain 14,789 No — No
United Kingdom 35,730 No Yes Nomarkets in Europe involves a compromise be-
tween host country control and the creation of
a single market. Harmonization of business
rules will not be complete and, in some cases,
may not be even close.
The potential gains from removing barriers to
the spread of new products across borders
seem to be positive and potentially quite large.
Lower-cost producers of financial services prod-
ucts would prosper at the expense of less effi-
cient firms that now survive only because of
regulations that limit competition by foreign
firms. Consumers would benefit from having a
greater variety of products from which to choose
and would pay lower prices fot’ them.
The basic problem is the resistance by some
countries to relaxing domestic regulation of an
industry. Frequently, a country’s business rules
inhibit product innovation. For example, current
German regulations restrict the introduction of
new insurance products into Germany. Even
with a common passport, a foreign insurance
firm faces a majom’ deterrent to entering the
German market. Taken together, German citizens
and foreign insurance firms clearly would benefit
from free trade in new products, but it is also
clear that some German insurance companies
would suffer from the influx of competition.
This is the area where the least progress has
been made in the 1992 program. In view of the
time required to reach and implement EC deci-
sions, as well as the current controversy about
these decisions, the potentially large gains from
product innovation and lower prices in many
financial services will not be realized any time
in the near future.
SIN(.;Yii~ MAi:$h,EI’
The preceding discussion raises doubts about
how sizable the gains will be from the 1992
legislation in the financial services sector;
however, we do not provide an estimate of the
gains themselves.” These doubts are at odds
with the potential gains estimated in the Cecchi-
ni Report, the best-known attempt to measure
such gains.” This report found substantial
potential gains from the creation of a single
market in many industries.” The gains from the
liberalization of the financial services sector,
which are presented and examined below, were
found to be substantial as well.
The reduction of trade barriers can generate
gains via a number of routes, all of which are
driven by increased competitive pressures. For
example, the reduction of trade barriers will al-
low firms with lower production costs to ex-
pand their production, increasing total output
and economic welfare. Other gains can be real-
ized as larger markets increase the opportuni-
ties to use certain production technologies that
lower per-unit production costs. Finally, in-
creased competition tends to drive down profit
margins, eliminate waste and stimulate the de-
velopment of new products and less costly
methods to produce existing products. Ultimate-
ly, the competitive pressures will allow con-
sumers throughout the EC to consume (use)
more financial services at lower prices per unit.
The competitive pressures resulting from 1992
are expected to narrow the price differences of
a financial service across the EC. As part of the
Cecchini Report, Price Waterhouse calculated
prices across eight EC countries for the 16
financial services—seven banking services, five
insurance services and four securities services—
listed in table 2. The average of the four lowest
prices for each service was chosen as the likely
price after the elimination of trade barriers.
The potential price declines for financial serv-
ices are listed in table 3. Exactly how much of
this potential decline will be realized is difficult
to estimate, so an expected decline (with a
plus/minus 5 percentage-point range) was de-
fined as one-half of the potential decline.
2lTo reiterate, we are not questioning the gains from the
abolition of exchange controls; rather, we are questioning
the gains from the common passport in light of the con-
tinuation of different conduct of business rules.
221n theory, the abolition of trade barriers for goods traded
among a group of countries may or may not yield net
benefits. An elementary demonstration of this result can
be found in Coughlin (1990).
23The Cecchini Report estimates that the gains from com-
pleting the internal market range from 4.3 percent to 6.4
percent of gross domestic product in the EC. See Cough-
lin (1991) for an examination of the approach used in the
Cecchini Report as well as other approaches used to esti-
mate the economic effects of 1992.Table 2
List of Standard Financial Services or Products Surveyed
Name of standard service Description of standard service
Banking services
1 Consumer credit Annual cost of consumer loan of 500 ECU Excess in
terest rate over money market rates
2. Credit cards Annual cost assuming 500 ECU debit Excess interest
rate over money market rates.
3. Mortgages Annual cost of home loan of 25,000 ECU Excess in-
terest rate over money market rates.
4 Letters of credit Cost of letter ofcredit of 50,000 ECU for three
months
5. Foreign exchange drafts Cost to a large commercial client to purchase a com-
mercial draft for 30,000 ECU
6 Travellers checks Cost for a private consumer to purchase 500 ECU
worth of travellers checks
7 Commercial loans Annual cost (including commissions and charges) to a
medium-sized firm ofa commercial loan of250,000
ECU
Insurance services
I Life insurance Average annual cost of term (life) insurance
2 Home insurance Annual cost of fire and theft coverage for house
valued at 70 000 ECU with 28,000 ECU contents
3 Motor insurance Annual cost of comprehensive insurance 1 6 liter car,
driver 10 years experience, no-claims bonus
4 Commercial fireand theft Annual coverage for premises valued at 387,240 ECU
and stock at 232 344 ECU.
5 Public liability coverage Annual premium for engineering company with 20 em
ployees and annual turnover of 1.29 million ECU.
Brokerage services
1 Pnvate equity transactions Commission costs of cash bargain of 1 440 ECU.
2 Private gilt transactions Commission costs of cash bargain of 14,000 ECU
3. Institutional equity transactions Commission costs of cash bargain of288,000 ECU
4 Institutional gilt transactions Commission costs of cash bargain of 72 million ECU
SOURCE. Emerson et al. (1988) p 102
Using the expected price decltnes for financial have been priced as if the characteristics are
sert ices, the gains for the eight EC countries cx- the same in each country. For example, no at
amined are estimated to be 21.6 billion ECU, tempt ha been made to adjust for theft and
which is 0.7 percent of their gross domestic mortality differences across countrie , and,
produ ~ 24 The distribution of these gain across hence, it is not clear that homogeneous
the FC are listed in table 4. One’s confidence in products are compared.
these estimates, as acknowledged in Emerson et
al. (1988), should not be great. First, the price More important, even if price differences exist
comparisons themselves can be questioned. for identical products, it is far from clear that
Products such as “credit” and “life insurance” the 1992 legislation will eliminate such differ-
241he ECU, which stands for the European Currency Unit, is likely to become the single currency of the EC. For a brief
composed of the weighted averages of the currencies of history of the ECU, especially recent developments see
the 12 member countries and is the unit of account for the Tyley (1991). One ECU was equal to $1.29 on February













United Kingdom 13 2-12
SOURCE: Emerson et al (1988), p 104.
ences. The reason is that business rules will
continue to differ from country to country,
thereby impeding trade in financial services and
limiting potential gains to levels below those es-
timated in the table.25 Thus, the value of the
single passport is diminished considerably by
the inability of firms entering new markets to
offer a full line of products and services.
Grilli (1989a) has also raised doubts about the
estimates in the Cecchini Report on the likely
effects of liberalization on wholesale and retail
banking throughout the EC. Gnu doubts whether
a perfectly competitive market structure is an
accurate approximation of retail banking
post-1992. Much evidence suggests that banks
have market power in their retail markets that
will not be eliminated by the 1992 legislation.
For example, within the same country, which is
already a homogeneous regulatory and institu-
tional environment, the terms of a deposit con-
tract, such as the interest rate paid on a time
deposit, frequently vary across banks. In addi-
tion, the transaction costs of switching between
domestic and foreign bank accounts will remain
after 1992, and a business relationship with a
local bank will remain less complicated than







F’ance 3.683 0 5
Germany 4.619 06
Italy 3.996 0 7
Luxembourg 44 1 2
Netherlands 347 0.2
Spain 3.189 1.5
United Kingdom 5,051 0.8
Total 21.614 07
SOURCE Emerson ec al. (1988), p. 106.
the use of other, more appropriate market struc-
tures produces smaller estimated gains from
1992 than those based on perfect competition.
The bottom line is that the estimates in the
Cecchini Report are probably optimistic. Of
course, the absence of better estimates precludes
any quantitative statements about the degree of
overstatement.
The preceding discussion, including the esti-
mates in the Cecchini Report, has presumed
that 12 currencies continue to exist within the
EC, albeit tied together by the exchange rate
target zones of the European Monetary System
(EMS). Thus, far from there being a single mar-
ket in financial services, there will continue to
be 12 quite separate markets at the retail level.
Within those markets, firms will operate separa-
ble portfolios and most retail customers will
stick almost exclusively to their domestic en-
vironment.2°
The creation of a single currency, which was
agreed upon at Maastricht, the Netherlands, in
25
Evidence that supports this view was highlighted by Grilli
(1989b). For individual financial services, he noted that the
price dispersion across countries that had already liberal-
ized, like Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom, was no less than across
the remaining EC members.
265eparable portfolios means that a bank with subsidiaries
in more than one member state will operate a matched
deposit and loan book in each currency. For example, a
Dutch bank with a subsidiary in Greece will use drachma
deposits rather than guilder deposits to fund drachma
loans.
Table 4
Estimated Gains Resulting from the
Expected Price Reductions for
Financial ServicesDecember 1991 will induce major changes, ir-
respective of the regulatory regime.2~Obviously,
the foreign exchange market—and with it the
costs of currency conversion—among the EC
members will be eliminated. Closely related is
the fact that the international accounting of
many businesses will be simplified by the elimi-
nation of multiple currencies. On the other
hand, many contracts will have to be rewritten.
For example, a long-term bond contract that re-
quires interest and principal payments in a
specific currency, say French francs, will have
to be modified.
Generally, retail customers will continue to do
business with familiar institutions in their own
countries, while wholesale market arbitrage and
potential competition ensure that product prices
are brought closely into line throughout the EC.
These competitive pressures will lead to changes
in the regulatory structure so that the conduct
of business rules become more similar and, in
some cases, identical; otherwise, firms in some
countries will be at a competitive disadvantage
relative to firms in other countries.28 It is
difficult to predict exactly how business rules
will be harmonized for each financial service
and, thus, how extensive the potential gains
from a “free” single market will actually be. A
more homogeneous and unitary monitoring
mechanism is likely, although its full implica-
tions are equally hard to anticipate. Nonetheless,
the gains from a single market are more likely
to be realized if monetary union is achieved.
The goal of 1992 is to create a single Europe-
an market, a goal that encompasses the finan-
cial services sector. Our assessment is that the
1992 reforms are a small step toward the liber-
alization of the financial services sector. Clearly,
1992 will contribute to the realization of some
gains, especially in countries that have previous-
ly resisted liberalization. Nonetheless, serious
doubts exist about how’ extensive the changes
will be in the near future and, thus, the magni-
tude of the gains to be realized overall. In reali-
ty, the 1992 legislation will not cause major
changes. The reason is that virtually all of the
potential efficiency gains in the financial serv-
ices sector can be (or have been) achieved
through the combination of the abolition of ex-
change controls and the freedom of foreign
firms to enter domestic markets. In fact, the
former was implemented in July 1990 (in all
Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland).
but
The key innovation of the 1992 legislation is
the split between home country authorization
and host country conduct of business rules.
This dichotomy will create problems. Whereas
wholesale markets already are highly integrated,
not just within Europe but at the global level,
12 quite different retail markets will continue to
existin the near future. This segmentation means
that many existing regulatory burdens will re-
main; however, regulatory complications may
multiply as numerous domestic and EC authori-
ties become involved in the supervision of a sin-
gle firm. Finally, in some markets, like insurance,
rigid regulation of domestic markets will delay
any implementation of the current model of a
framework directive until well beyond 1992.
The greatest boost to financial market integra-
tion, once markets are open, will be the use of
a single currency. With a single currency, pres-
sure will mount to revise the regulatory struc-
ture so that the conduct of business rules are
homogeneous.
Major changes in the regulatory structure lie
ahead. It is these changes that will create a sin-
gle market and allow for the realization of sub-
stantial gains in the next century.
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